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SUBJECT: USOSCE EXPLORES POTENTIAL ROLE FOR OSCE IN
AFGHANISTAN

REF: 07 STATE 105316

[¶](#)11. (SBU) Post welcomed the visit of Powell Moore and LTC Alan Hester of USOSCE on January 28 - 30 for consultations on how the OSCE might support U.S. and international objectives in Afghanistan. Moore and Hester paid office calls on the Ambassador, Commander of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Major General Cone and held a series of roundtable discussions with Embassy, USAID and CSTC-A personnel. The delegation also observed elements of the 8-week basic police training course at the INL managed Central Training Center (CTC), to provide context for potential OSCE-managed training centers.

FIVE IDEAS

[¶](#)12. (SBU) Over the course of the three-day visit, five areas emerged for possible OSCE involvement in Afghanistan which will require further elaboration, to include:

-- Regional economic integration: Ambassador Wood encouraged efforts from USOSCE representatives on promoting economic integration between Afghanistan and Central Asian OSCE member states. As the only multilateral organization which includes Europe, the Russian Federation and Central Asia, OSCE is uniquely placed to help build regional free trade and commercial ties among Afghanistan and the Central Asian states. This in turn could help open markets between Central Asia and South Asia - Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

-- Customs training: Afghanistan has not fully exploited customs as a potential source of revenue and currently needs a national customs training center. USOSCE's proposal to provide customs and border police mentors and trainers for Afghanistan's northern border crossing points, if properly

coordinated with nation-wide standards, would be a step in the right direction. But a recent study found that customs revenue from the three northern neighbors accounts for less than 20% of Afghanistan's overall revenue since the majority of Afghanistan's trade takes place with Iran and Pakistan. Post urges that, if the OSCE decides to engage on customs training, it should address national and not just regional requirements to build a nationally trained customs officials cadre.

-- Afghan Border Police (ABP) training: Neither the Afghan Government nor the international community have yet to institute a comprehensive training program for border police.

One option for OSCE would be to establish a national border police training center to train up to the authorized ABP strength of 18,000 (there are currently about 10,500 in the ABP ranks, about one third of which are untrained). This would entail significant security and personnel expenses, but would address a key unmet requirement. A more modest alternative would be for the OSCE to establish a regional training center in the north to serve as a counterpart to the future border training facility in Kabul that Germany has indicated it may open, and the INL-run Regional training Center in Gardez that focuses on basic ABP training. Post believes a northern border police training facility might prove advantageous due to a comparatively safer security environment and the proximity of OSCE's ongoing border management training project in Tajikistan. In creating a regional center, OSCE should avoid locations that could be perceived to support northern warlords or favor one ethnic group over another.

-- Integration of border security and customs regimes along the northern Afghan border among Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan: The OSCE should focus on developing in depth

coordinated drug-interdiction among the border and customs enforcement authorities and police of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Afghan heroin flows through these three neighboring countries into Europe triggering reverse flows of money to criminals and insurgents in Afghanistan. OSCE is uniquely well positioned to break that vicious cycle.

By enhancing Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan's ability to interdict heroin and drug profits outside Afghanistan, OSCE would greatly assist the international community's enterprise inside Afghanistan.

-- Niche training at a proposed National Police Training Center: OSCE might consider sponsoring training at a future Afghan National Police Training Center which CSTD-A and INL are developing. The proposed center will grow from an initial capacity of 1000 by fall 2008 to a capacity to train 2000 police personnel by 2010. While planning is still ongoing, it is likely that some portion of the capacity can be devoted to border police training programs. Under this scenario, OSCE would be able to offer niche training courses such as border police training without the potentially prohibitive startup or security costs of creating a new training center. OSCE might also take on the role of providing human rights training at the ANPTC, a role currently carried out by INL at the Regional Training Centers.

CAUTIONARY NOTE: COME PREPARED TO SUPPORT YOURSELF AND TO ADD NEW RESOURCES

13. (SBU) If it decides to establish a presence in Afghanistan, the OSCE must be prepared to provide for all its security, lodging and logistical requirements. Operations in Afghanistan require extraordinary expense and OSCE should not expect security or logistical support from the United States or other international actors without prior agreement. Embassy Kabul would also oppose any proposal that would reduce or further divide current levels of assistance by OSCE participating states. Many European OSCE members dedicate significant national resources to Afghanistan through NATO-ISAF, EUPOL, EU, UN and other contributions; any OSCE project here should be supported by new resources (e.g.,

ideally from member states, such as Kazakhstan, that are not already heavily invested in Afghanistan). Finally, we would urge that OSCE limit itself to technical training that will not require that it have a seat in policy fora beyond what is required to ensure an OSCE training effort is fully coordinated with broader international community efforts; the international community currently is struggling to gain coherence and effective coordination, and adding another international organization's voice to the discussion would not promote greater unity of effort. USOSCE should take note that the Embassy is reexamining the BMTF mission which might result in greater USG focus on customs and border training. The result of this change should be factored into the USOSCE draft proposal and Embassy Kabul will keep USOSCE informed of any changes.

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